Submissions
Submission Preparation Checklist
As part of the submission process, authors are required to check off their submission's compliance with all of the following items, and submissions may be returned to authors that do not adhere to these guidelines.- The submission has not been previously published, nor is it before another journal for consideration (or an explanation has been provided in Comments to the Editor).
- The submission file is in OpenOffice, Microsoft Word, or RTF document file format.
- Where available, URLs for the references have been provided.
- The text is single-spaced; uses a 12-point font; employs italics, rather than underlining (except with URL addresses); and all illustrations, figures, and tables are placed within the text at the appropriate points, rather than at the end.
- The text adheres to the stylistic and bibliographic requirements outlined in the Author Guidelines.
Free Submission
Free Submission Articles
Phenomenology, Axiology, and Metaethics
Special Issue of Phenomenology and Mind
Deadline for paper submissions: February 15th, 2022
The issue will be published in December 2022
Call for Papers
Today the philosophical debate on values and their possible experience is still one of the most crucial to engage with. This is not just because of the ethical, social or political upshots it can possibly have, but also because of the theoretical issues it posits, which still need to be deeply investigated. Such an investigation is perhaps particularly required on the side of phenomenology. Indeed, even though classic phenomenologists such as Husserl, Scheler, Stein, Ingarden, von Hildebrand and others have dedicated important works to these themes, their heritage still needs to be explored and further developed, in particular to make a phenomenological discourse on axiology that can be fruitfully put in dialogue with other philosophical perspectives on the status of values, such as those developed and still discussed in the metaethical debate.
Against this background, the journal Phenomenology and Mind invites submissions for a special issue dedicated to “Phenomenology and Metaethics”. The volume will aim at providing phenomenological insights both on the noematic side of the issue, investigating the nature of axiological properties, and on the noetic side, focusing on the experience of such properties. In this context, a – non-exhaustive – list of possible questions to investigate is the following:
- What is the nature of axiological properties?
- What is the relation between axiological properties and natural ones?
- Can the relation between axiological properties and natural ones be accounted for in terms of phenomenological Fundierung? And what about accounting for them in terms of supervenience?
- How can we phenomenologically describe the relation between goods and values?
- Is it possible to develop an actual material axiology? What would it be like?
- How do we experience axiological properties?
- Can we account for the experience of axiological properties in perceptual terms?
- What is the role of intuition – if any – in the experience of axiological properties? How should intuition be conceived properly in this context?
- Is the experience of axiological properties a form of feeling? How should we describe it?
Guest Editors
Andrea Cimino (KU Leuven)
Dermot Moran (Boston College)
Andrea Staiti (University of Parma)
Submission Guidelines
Submissions must be prepared for double blind review. Manuscripts – in .doc format – should not contain any identifying information and must not exceed 6000 words (references included).
Moreover, they must contain:
- An abstract of no more than 150 words
- 4/5 keywords
All manuscripts must be in English
For stylistic details, see: http://www.rosenbergesellier.it/ita/riviste/phenomenology-and-mind/norme-redazionali;
Submissions should be sent via the Phenomenology and Mind website
(http://www.fupress.net/index.php/pam) by February 15th, 2022.
The author should register here and then log in to submit her paper. Please, be sure to submit your paper to the session “Phenomenology, Axiology, and Metaethics”
For information, please contact: andreasebastiano.staiti@unipr.it
Important dates:
Deadline for submissions: February 15th, 2022
Notification of acceptance: April 15th, 2022
Publication of the issue: December 2022
The True, the Valid and the Normative
Call for papers
The inquiry into the concepts of true and false has generally privileged, in contemporary philosophy, apophantic truth, that is, the truth of dicta (sentences, propositions, statements, or utterances). However, the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ seem to also apply to other entities apart from dicta. Amedeo Giovanni Conte, among others, brought back attention to the not infrequent cases where we speak of the truth and falsity of res, of things. In what sense, for instance, can we speak of true gold, a true diamond, a true warrior, or the true Kant? And in what sense can we speak of false gold, a false diamond, a false name, a false will, or a false banknote? Further, can we argue that a true warrior ought to be brave? The answer to such questions seems to imply the distinction introduced by Conte (2016) between two species of truth: de dicto, or semantic truth, which specifically pertains to a dictum qua dictum, and de re, or ontological truth, which generally pertains to a res qua res, to a thing qua thing. What are the relations between the two species of truth? What do they have in common, and in what do they differ?
The introduction of the distinction between de re and de dicto truth into the debate on normativity and related issues discloses new perspectives that participants in this School are invited to explore. What is at stake are, on the one hand, the nature and scope of de dicto truth and de re truth respectively, along with their relations to one another; on the other hand, the possible impact of these two notions on the investigations on normativity and its sources, as well as on the notions of validity and effectiveness of norms.
When considering the issue of the scope of de dicto truth, one may ask whether de dicto truth is to be predicated exclusively of apophantic sentences or constative utterances (Austin 1950; 1962), or whether it can be predicated also of anapophantic sentences, such as performative sentences—which appear to be self-verifying. Given that a similar form of self-verification seems to be implied also in prescriptive sentences, what kind of facts, or states-of-affairs are brought about by such sentences? Is it possible to speak of “deontic states-of-affairs” (Conte 1970; 2006; see also Sbisà 2014 on deontic states and deontic objects)? What would be the implications for the investigation of the relations between truth and validity of norms? Notably, can the validity of norms—at least when norms are understood as prescriptive sentences—be conceived as a form of de dicto truth, that is, as the correspondence to a deontic reality? Is such a deontic reality to be understood exclusively as a product of prescriptive sentences, or is it also possible to conceive a pre-existent deontic reality? What would be the implications as to the possibility of applying logic to norms?
When considering the notion of de re truth, on the other hand, what can be its implications for the philosophy of the normative? Notably, is there a relation between de re truth and the normative and axiological dimensions of reality?
The fact that we call invalid banknotes “false” banknotes suggests, for instance, that at least in the domain of institutional phenomena the de re truth or falsity of an entity is directly linked to and conditioned by the very norms or constitutive rules that determine the validity conditions of that entity. Should we speak here of a “normative truth of things”? Can it be argued, conversely, that in other circumstances specific oughts or norms can be derived from the de re truth of an entity—like when we say that a true warrior ought to be brave, as suggested by Edmund Husserl (1900-1901)? Is this a further kind of normative truth of things? How does the concept of de re truth relate to the notion of “eidetic legality”? Can it be fruitful for the determination of the bonds and constraints that phenomena lay upon thought, language, action, and reality?
Warrior is also a good example of what scholars have recently called ‘dual character concepts’—concepts that encode both a descriptive dimension and an independent normative dimension for categorization (Knobe, Prasada, & Newman 2013; Leslie 2015; Reuter 2019). When is a person appropriately categorised as a true warrior? Can the notion of de re truth help us illuminate the normative dimension of dual character concepts?
A final aspect of the investigation of the relations between truth and normativity concerns the controversial notion of the effectiveness of norms. Some legal philosophers maintain that the existence of norms should be identified with their effectiveness within a social group, and that consequently an ineffective norm is not a de re true norm. Others suggest that satisfaction, or fulfilment, rather than validity, should be considered as the deontic análogon of de dicto truth in the logic of imperatives and norms. Both these perspectives, however, arouse the following question: are all norms capable of being fulfilled? For instance, a norm establishing that one’s legal capacity begins with birth does not seem to be fulfillable at all, since it does not prescribe any behaviour. Furthermore, does the fulfilment of a norm exhaust the possible ways in which a norm affects an agent’s behaviour? For instance, if we consider a poker cheater, aren’t the rules of poker, despite not being fulfilled, still operating and impacting on her/his behaviour when s/he hides an ace up his sleeve—as suggested by the notion of “nomotropic behaviour” introduced by Conte (2000; 2016)? How does the phenomenon of nomotropic behaviour relate to the notions of both de dicto and de re truth of norms?
Section 1. Truth of language vs. truth of things
- The truth of linguistic entities vs the truth of non-linguistic entities: what do de dicto (semantic) and de re (ontological) truth have in common? How do they differ?
- In what sense can an object (a res) be true? In what sense can it be false?
- What is the difference between ‘a true professor’ and ‘the true professor’? Can we speak of de re truth both in relation to the correspondence to an eîdos and the correspondence to an ídion?
- Are there true questions and true lies?
- What are the relations between the de dicto and de re truth (or falsity) of linguistic entities? Can the de dicto truth (or falsity) of a linguistic entity condition, or be conditioned, by its de re truth (or falsity)?
- Does the notion of de dicto truth boil down to apophantic truth, or anapophantic dicta can be de dicto true, too—as the self-verification of performatives suggests?
Section 2. Truth and validity
- Can de dicto (semantic) truth be predicated of norms? Do prescriptive sentences self-verify?
- Is there a deontic reality to which norms may truly correspond?
- Is the validity of norms the logical deontic análogon of the de dicto truth of apophantic propositions?
- Can the deontic validity of a norm be derived from the logical validity of an inference?
- In what sense the de re truth of an institutional entity may depend upon the rules or norms on its validity?
- Is an invalid norm still a de re true norm? What is the relation between de re truth, validity and existence of norms?
Section 3. Truth and the normative and axiological dimensions of reality
- What are the normative implications of de re truth?
- Can an ought be derived from the ontological truth of an entity?
- Is a true x a good x? Is ‘true’ an evaluative predicate?
- Can the notion of de re truth be fruitful for the investigation of dual character concepts?
- In what sense a token is a true or a false token of a type? In what sense a type is the true type of a class of tokens?
- What are the ontological conditions of the de re truth of an entity?
- How does the concept of de re truth relate to the notion of “eidetic legality” and to the bonds and constraints that phenomena lay upon thought, language, action, and reality?
Section 4. Truth and validity in action: norm effectiveness and nomotropic behaviour
- What are the relations between de re truth, validity and effectiveness of norms? Is an ineffective norm still a valid and de re true norm?
- Is the satisfaction or fulfilment of a norm the deontic análogon of the de dicto truth of propositions?
- Can a norm be verified by action?
- Does the effectiveness of norms boil down to fulfilment?
- Are there true norms that are incapable of being fulfilled?
- In what sense the behaviour of a thief or a cheater is still a “nomotropic behaviour”?
Submissions must be prepared for double-blind review. Manuscripts – in .doc format – should not contain any identifying information and they cannot exceed 4000 words (references included). Manuscripts must be written in English. Moreover, they must contain:
- an abstract of no more than 150 words;
- the indication of the section to which the author(s) wants to contribute;
- 4/5 keywords.
For stylistic details, see:
http://www.rosenbergesellier.it/eng/journals/phenomenology-and-mind/editorial-norms
Submissions should be sent via the Phenomenology and Mind website by May 31st, 2021.
Authors should register here and then log in to submit their paper. Please, make sure to submit your paper to the session “The True, the Valid and the Normative”.
For further information, please contact Paolo Di Lucia (paolo.dilucia@unimi.it) and/or Lorenzo Passerini Glazel (lorenzo.passerini@unimib.it).
Important dates:
Deadline for submissions: May 31st, 2022.
Notification of acceptance: July 31st, 2022.
San Raffaele School of Philosophy: September 20th–22nd, 2022.
Publication of the special issue (expected): June 2023
Back to the things themselves. The practice of phenomenology
Deadline for paper submissions: June 30th, 2023
The issue will be published in June 2024
Call for Papers
Our aim is to focus on the core task of phenomenology, i.e., the description of concrete phenomena. This means especially: We do not want historical or meta-theoretical contributions regarding phenomenology, nor the works of certain phenomenologists. By this we intend to showcase phenomenology as a specific practice of philosophy in an exemplary way.
Concrete descriptions of different phenomena should be developed, and their validity discussed – descriptions, which are phenomenological in a specific sense, because they fulfill two criteria: firstly, they refer to experiences as experiences from the first-person perspective and secondly, they claim to determine necessary characteristics for this kind of experience through eidetic variations. Regarding the selection of phenomena, the special issue pursues a great variety. In the selection of phenomena, this special issue of Phenomenology and Mind strives for the greatest possible breadth. Descriptions of classical phenomena like: perception, imagination, time, body, morality, feeling, gender, art, literature and image; but also attempts to discover phenomena as phenomena sui generis through phenomenological description: such as from the fields of sport and movement, work and everyday life, quarantine and disease, digitality and technology, drugs and addiction, violence and conflict, kitsch and fashion.
Guest Editors
Lambert Wiesing (Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)
Thomas Zingelmann (Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)
Submission Guidelines
Submissions must be prepared for double blind review. Manuscripts – in .doc format – should not contain any identifying information and must not exceed 6000 words (references included).
Moreover, they must contain:
- an abstract of no more than 150 words
- 4/5 keywords
All manuscripts must be in English or German
For stylistic details, see: http://www.rosenbergesellier.it/eng/journals/phenomenology-and-mind/editorial-norms;
Submissions should be sent via the Phenomenology and Mind website
(http://www.rosenbergesellier.it/eng/journals/phenomenology-and-mind) by June 30th, 2023.
The author should register here and then log in to submit her paper. Please, be sure to submit your paper to the session “Back to the things themselves. The practice of phenomenology”
For information, please contact: thomas.zingelmann@uni-jena.de
Important dates:
Deadline for submissions: June 30th, 2023
First notification: September 30th, 2023
Publication of the issue: June 2024
Max Scheler in the debates on Europe
Submissions must be prepared for double blind review. Manuscripts – in .doc format – should not contain any identifying information and must not exceed 6000 words (references included).
Moreover, they must contain:
- An abstract of no more than 150 words
- 4/5 keywords
Manuscripts can be in German, French, English
For stylistic details, see: Editorial Norms (rosenbergesellier.it)
The Coming of Age
Invited speakers
Tiziana Andina (University of Turin)
Elvio Baccarini (University of Rijeka)
Simone Cenci (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University and San Raffaele Scientific Institute, Milan)
Danielle Petherbridge (University College Dublin)
Jessie Stanier (University of the West of England, Bristol)
Guest editors of the special issue
Maria Russo (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan)
Alessandro Volpe (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan)
Call for papers
Population ageing is a central phenomenon of our contemporary age. As a trend that concerns the whole world, individuals have increasing chances to reach old age due to improvements in survival, and the share of older people over the total population grows because of reductions in fertility. Not surprisingly, this trend is triggering several transformative processes concerning societies, welfare states, markets, medical practices and political agendas.
Ageing is not always equal to healthy ageing, so that many medical, social, and political issues arise in relation to ageing pathologies and the elderly’s specific vulnerabilities. Nonetheless, old age should not necessarily be considered as a time of mental and physical decline, which would only imply an increasing socioeconomic and health dependence. Indeed, a new way of looking at the elderly, their life, and their possible social role can and should constitute an opportunity for innovative trends in promoting inclusive well-being and in building more prosperous, just and sustainable societies.
On this background, ageing appears as a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon that, due to its existential, ethical, social and political dimensions, also offers a fruitful field for philosophical investigation.
For instance, the phenomenon of ageing societies requires new directions of research both on the peculiar existential aspects of the elderly’s lives and on the intergenerational relations that characterize the different types of social unities of our lifeworld. In this regard, a phenomenologically oriented ontology of the old person, which investigates the multifaceted ways in which one’s sense of oneself as an embodied person can change in aging, appears crucial. Correspondently, in the perspective of social ontology, interpersonal relations, as well as forms of we-agency and collective intentionality, should be reconsidered, taking aging and intergenerational issues into account, in order to outline an ontological, social, and normative model addressing age-based discrimination and inequality at the level of law, justice and health care.
When it comes to the elderly, moreover, a redefinition of the criteria for well-being and social solidarity seems to be necessary, considering that the specific vulnerabilities of the elderly change the perceived value of several capabilities, with respect to younger populations. Such a redefinition can be of inspiration for public policies aimed to provide sufficient levels of quality of life for the entire elderly population. Nonetheless, the social and economic differences among the elderly often create disparities of treatment for analogous diseases or conditions. These disparities constitute forms of inequality that must be corrected, so that issues of intra-generational justice, besides inter-generational ones, arise and require investigation.
Philosophically, it is also crucial to focus on the various specific vulnerabilities that ageing presents, from the likelihood of social isolation, to ageism, to the vulnerabilities connected to health issues. In such a context, an investigation on the duty to care, be it grounded on empathy and solidarity or on justice, appears crucial.
The San Raffaele School of Philosophy 2023 seeks to investigate these and related issues by hosting lectures by invited scholars and contributions by PhD students, post-docs, and experienced researchers selected by a double-blind peer review process.
Accepted papers will be published in a special issue of the journal Phenomenology and Mind (indexed in Scopus and The Philosopher’s Index, among others).
A (non-exhaustive) list of possible topics to explore is:
- old age, embodiment and personal identity;
- intergenerational relations, social unities and collective intentionality;
- vulnerabilities in the old age;
- well-being and quality of life of the elderly;
- intergenerational and intragenerational justice;
- care, solidarity, justice, and the elderly;
- communication in healthcare and intergenerational empathy;
- social cohesion and social reproduction;
- transgenerational societies.
Submissions must be prepared for double-blind review. Manuscripts – in .doc format – should not contain any identifying information and they cannot exceed 4000 words (references included). Manuscripts must be written in English. Moreover, they must contain:
- an abstract of no more than 150 words;
- 4/5 keywords.
For stylistic details, see:
https://www.rosenbergesellier.it/eng/journals/phenomenology-and-mind/editorial-norms
Submissions should be sent via the Phenomenology and Mind website by June 20th, 2023.
Authors should register here and then log in to submit their papers. Please, make sure to submit your paper to the section “The Coming of Age”.
For further information, please contact Alessandro Volpe (volpe.alessandro1@hsr.it) and/or Maria Russo (russo.maria@hsr.it).
Important dates:
Extended deadline for submissions: June 20th, 2023.
Notification of acceptance: July 31st, 2023.
San Raffaele School of Philosophy: October 4th–6th, 2023.
Publication of the special issue (expected): June 2025.
Structural Injustice
The Journal Phenomenology and Mind invites submissions for a special issue on “Structural Injustice: Reflections on Social Groups, Identity and Intersectionality”.
Traditionally, the debate on social justice has been largely dominated by matters of distributive justice. From a structural perspective, distributive justice focuses on social groups as differentiated along economic and productive dimensions. However, it has long been stressed that, without denying the importance of distributive justice, the emphasis on the economic dimension of justice overshadows many other axes − gender, race, disability, age, ethnicity, etc. − by virtue of which individuals may be a victim of injustice (Young 1990, 2001). While in the case of economic differences eliminating the disadvantage of an economic group coincides with eliminating the group itself, there is nothing so straightforward in the case of social groups whose identification depends on disadvantages determined by identity characteristics (Haslanger 2012). At least in some cases, in particular in the case of gender identities, the existence of a social group seems rather to depend on demands for recognition, and gender identities are primarily self-ascribed (Dembroff 2020).
Besides economic disadvantages, the injustice that members of certain social groups suffer seems to reside as much in social prejudices, as in actual instances of mistreatment. In these instances, injustices take various (and often intersected) forms. Oppression can be institutionalized and/or primarily encompass a symbolic harm perpetuated toward disadvantaged groups. Further, the harm can be directed toward individuals qua members of a specific group and can involve systemic forms of misrecognition often coupled with unwarranted biases regarding the epistemic credibility of these individuals (Dotson 2011; Fricker 2007, 2013). In general terms, addressing injustices related to identity groups requires clarifying the self-reinforcing dynamics between structural disadvantages and identity-based prejudices.
The volume aims at investigating the ways in which oppression, marginalization, and misrecognition are determined and/or fostered by practices, social standards, and attitudes concerning intersectional identities and how we should conceptualize social groups under these circumstances. Against this backdrop, a (non-exhaustive) list of possible topics to explore is:
- Criteria for identifying social groups;
- Social justice and identity differences;
- Capitalism and injustice;
- Feminist critiques of distributive justice;
- Feminist and intersectional analyses of discrimination and/or oppression;
- Intersectionality and social change;
- Role of stereotypes in processes of discrimination and oppression;
- Epistemic, cognitive, hermeneutic, and communicative injustices;
- Epistemic authority, credibility and power;
- Deconstruction of social concepts;
- Social reform and the role of education.
Guest Editors
Federica Liveriero (University of Pavia)
Ingrid Salvatore (University of Salerno)
Submission Guidelines
Submissions must be prepared for double blind review. Manuscripts - in .doc format - should not contain any identifying information and must not exceed 6.000 words (references included).
Moreover, they must contain:
- An abstract of no more than 150 words
- 4/5 keywords
All manuscripts must be in English
- Submissions should be sent via the Phenomenology and Mind website: http://www.rosenbergesellier.it/eng/journals/phenomenology-and-mind
- The author should register here and then log in to submit her paper. Please, be sure to submit your paper to the session “Structural Injustice”.
- For stylistic details, see: http://www.rosenbergesellier.it/eng/journals/phenomenology-and-mind/editorial-norms
- For information, please contact: liveriero@unipv.it and isalvatore@unisa.it
Important dates:
Deadline for submissions: 30 December 2023
First round notification: 30 March 2024
Publication of the issue: December 2024
Exploring Personal Identity. Philosophical Perspectives and Insights from Arts
Submissions must be prepared for double-blind review. Manuscripts – in .doc format – should not contain any identifying information and they cannot exceed 4000 words (references included). Manuscripts must be written in English. Moreover, they must contain:
- an abstract of no more than 150 words;
- 4/5 keywords.
For stylistic details, see:
https://www.rosenbergesellier.it/eng/journals/phenomenology-and-mind/editorial-norms
Submissions should be sent via the Phenomenology and Mind website by June 30th, 2024.
Authors should register here and then log in to submit their papers. Please, make sure to submit your paper to the section “Exploring Personal Identity. Philosophical Perspectives and Insights from Arts”.
For further information, please contact Francesca Cesarano (fr.cesarano01@gmail.com) and/or Marco Di Feo (mardifco@gmail.com) and/or Eleonora Volta (e.volta@studenti.unisr.it).
Important dates:
Deadline for submissions: June 30th, 2024.
Notification of acceptance: August 23rd, 2024.
San Raffaele School of Philosophy: October 2th–4th, 2024.
Publication of the special issue (expected): December 2025.
Privacy Statement
The names and email addresses entered in this journal site will be used exclusively for the stated purposes of this journal and will not be made available for any other purpose or to any other party.